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ABSTRACT 
A serious threat today is malicious executables. It is designed to damage computer system and some of 
them spread over network without the knowledge of the owner using the system. Two approaches have 
been derived for it i.e. Signature Based Detection and Heuristic Based Detection. These approaches 
performed well against known malicious programs but cannot catch the new malicious programs. 
Different researchers have proposed methods using data mining and machine learning for detecting new 
malicious programs. The method based on data mining and machine learning has shown good results 
compared to other approaches. 
This work presents a static malware detection system using data mining techniques such as Information 
Gain, Principal component analysis, and three classifiers: SVM, J48, and Naïve Bayes. For overcoming 
the lack of usual anti-virus products, we use methods of static analysis to extract valuable features of 
Windows PE file. We extract raw features of Windows executables which are PE header information, 
DLLs, and API functions inside each DLL of Windows PE file. Thereafter, Information Gain, calling 
frequencies of the raw features are calculated to select valuable subset features, and then Principal 
Component Analysis is used for dimensionality reduction of the selected features. By adopting the 
concepts of machine learning and data-mining, we construct a static malware detection system which has 
a detection rate of 99.6%. 
KEYWORDS 
Malware Detection, Malicious Codes, Malware, Malware Detection, Information Security, Data Mining   
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cohen first formalized the term computer virus in 1983, it has evolved into malware detection 
[1]. Malicious programs, commonly termed as malware, can be classified into Virus, Trojans, 
Backdoors, and Logic bomb and a variety of other classes [2]. Computer malware remains a 
major thread to today’s computer systems and networks. According to a recent threat report by 
Symantec, trends for 2011, created 403 million new malicious code signatures, which is a 41% 
increase over 2010, when 286 new malicious code signatures were added [3]. 
Although most common detection method is a signature based detection that makes the core of 
most commercial anti-virus programs, it is not effective against “zero-day attacks“ or previously 
unknown malwares. The focus of malware researchers has shifted to find more generalized and 
scalable features that can identify previously unknown malwares instead of a static signature. 
Two basic types of approaches are used to analyse malware that are static and dynamic analysis. 
In the static analysis code and structure of a program is examined without actually running the 
program while dynamic analysis the program is executed in a real or virtual environment. 
In this work we propose a static malware detection system using data mining techniques that it 
automatically extracts features of malware and clean programs and uses them to classify 
programs into malicious or benign executables. Our goal in the evaluation of this system is to 
simulate the task of detecting new malicious executables. 
2. RELATED WORKS 
We consider details of most relevant malware detection techniques in this section. In recent 
years many malware researchers have focused on data mining to detect unknown malwares. 
Data mining is the process of analyzing electronically stored data by automatically searching for 
patterns [5]. Machine learning algorithms have been used widely for different data mining 
problems to detect patterns and to find correlations between data instances and attributes. Many 
researchers have used n-grams or API calls as their primary type of feature that  are used to 
represent malware instances in a suitable format for data mining purposes.  
Shultz et al. [6] proposed a method using data mining techniques for detecting new malicious 
executables. Three different types of features are extracted from the executables, i.e. the list of 
DLLs used by the binary, the list of DLL function calls, and number of different system calls 
used within each DLL. Also they analyze byte sequences extracted from the hexdump of an 
executable. The data set consisted of 4,266 files out of which 3,265 were malicious and 1,001 
were legitimate or benign programs. A rule induction algorithm called Ripper [7] was applied to 
find patterns in the DLL data. A learning algorithm Naïve Bayes (NB), which is based on 
Bayesian statistics, was used to find patterns in the string data and n-grams of byte sequences 
were used as input data for the Multinomial Naïve Bayes algorithm. A data set is partitioned in 
two data sets, i.e., a test data set and a training data set. This is to allow for performance testing 
on data that are independent from the data used to generate the classifiers. The Naïve Bayes 
algorithm, using strings as input data, yielded the highest classification performance with an 
accuracy of 97.11%. The authors compared their results with traditional signature-based 
methods and claimed that the data mining-based detection rate of new malware was twice as 
high in comparison to the signature-based algorithm.  
A similar approach was used by J. Z. Kolter et al. [8], where they use n-gram analysis and data 
mining  approaches to detect malicious executables in the wild. The authors used a hexdump 
utility to convert each executable to hexadecimal code in an ASCII format and produced n-gram 
features by combining each four-byte sequence into a single term. Their primary dataset 
consisted of 1971 clean and 1651 malicious programs They used different classifiers including 
Instance-based Learner, TFIDF, Naive-Bayes, Support vector machines, Decision tree, boosted 
Naive-Bayes, SVMs and boosted decision tree. They used information gain to select valued 
features which are provided as input to all classifiers. The area under an ROC curve (AUC) is a 
more complete measure compared with the detection accuracy as they reported [9]. AUCs show 
that the boosted decision trees outperform rest of the classifiers for both classification problems.  
M. Siddiqui et al. [10] used Data Mining for detection of Worms. They used variable length 
instruction sequence. Their Primary data set consists of 2,775 Windows PE files, in which in 
which 1,444 were worms and 1,330 were benign. They performed detection of compilers, 
common packers and crypto before disassembly of files. Sequence reduction was performed and 
97% of the sequences were removed. They used Decision Tree, Bagging and Random Forest 
models using. Random forest performed slightly better than the others.  
3. MALWARE DETECTION SYSTEM’S ARCHITECTURE 
We describe the architecture of our proposed system in this section. This system is to accurately 
detect new malware (unknown malware) binaries using a number of data mining techniques. 
Figure 3 shows the architecture of our malware detection system. The system consists of three 
main modules: (1) PE-Miner, (2) feature selection and data transformation, and (3) learning 
algorithms. 
 
 
Figure 1. Architecture of the Malware Detection System 
Module 1: PE-Miner parses PE tables of all executables to find out all PE header information, 
DLL names, and API functions inside each DLL as raw features; 
Module 2: Information Gain value of each PE header, and calling frequency of each DLL and 
API function inside DLL are computed and those raw features with Information Gain values 
and calling frequencies greater than a threshold are selected; then Principal Component Analysis 
is applied to further transform and reduce the number of features; 
Module 3: According to the features after PCA, transform every program in the database to its 
corresponding feature vector and then use a learning algorithm to derive a classification result 
from these labeled feature vectors; 
3.1. Dataset description 
Our dataset consists of a total of a total 247348 Windows programs in PE file format that are 
236756 malicious and 10592 clean programs. There were no duplicate programs in our dataset. 
The malicious programs were obtained from several sources such as VX Heavens Virus 
Collection database, which is available for free download in the public domain [4], our local 
laboratory, and our colleague’s laboratory in Taiwan. The numbers of malicious programs are 
grouped by their corresponding family name in Table 1. The clean programs were collected 
from Download.com [11], Windows’ system files and our local laboratory’s program files. 
We only consider non-packed Windows binary files in PE format. Some malware writers 
compress their code to make them undetectable by antivirus programs. So we first used number 
of most popular tools to decompress the files, which are compressed, such as UPX, ASPack, 
PECompact, etc. that make the PE files recognizable by PE parser. We developed a PE file 
parser named PE Miner, which extracts all PE format file’s header information, DLLs, and API 
functions inside each DLL of the programs in the dataset.  
 
 
Table 1. Number of malicious programs grouped by their family name 
Name of malicious program Counts 
 
Name of malicious program Counts 
Backdoor 51,457 
 
Trojan-IM 481 
Trojan 46,142 
 
Packed 379 
Trojan-Downloader 44,410 
 
IM-Worm 379 
Trojan-GameThief 29,050 
 
not-virus_Hoax 318 
Virus 26,941 
 
Trojan-Mailfinder 301 
Trojan-PSW 16,889 
 
Flooder 267 
Trojan-Spy 11,748 
 
DoS 257 
Trojan-Dropper 8,193 
 
Email-Flooder 196 
Trojan-Banker 6,986 
 
Trojan-DDoS 135 
Worm 6,152 
 
IM-Flooder 134 
Email-Worm 3,314 
 
Trojan-Ransom 94 
Rootkit 3,210 
 
SpamTool 64 
Trojan-Clicker 2844 
 
Trojan-Notifier 59 
Trojan-Proxy 2045 
 
SMS-Flooder 57 
Exploit 1938 
 
Spoofer 26 
Net-Worm 1938 
 
not-virus_BadJoke 20 
Hoax 1216 
 
Trojan-SMS 14 
Constructor 933 
 
Unknown 2 
HackTool 775 
 
Sniffer 2 
VirTool 604 
 
not-a-virus_NetTool 1 
P2P-Worm 573 
 
not-a-virus_RemoteAdmin 1 
IRC-Worm 545 
 
  
3.2 Feature extraction 
The information of an executable can be easily derived its PE file format without running 
programs [12,13]. We developed an application named "PE-Miner" to parse PE tables of 
Windows executable programs in the collected dataset. The PE Miner extracts all PE header 
information, DLL names, and API function names called within those DLLs contained in a PE 
file. The PE-Miner program stores all the extracted information in a database. In this study, the 
PE-Miner program extracted all raw features of 236756 malicious and 10592 clean programs 
and stored them in a database. These features are summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. List of raw features extracted from PE files 
№ Description Data Type Quantity 
1 Unique DLL features Binary 792 
2 Unique API function calls Binary 24,662 
3 PE DOS header  Integer 31 
4 PE file header  Integer 7 
5 PE optional headers  Integer 30 
6 PE data directories Integer 16 
7 PE section headers  Integer 10 
8 PE import description  Integer 5 
9 PE export description  Integer 11 
10 PE resource table  Integer 6 
11 PE debug info  Integer 8 
12 PE delay import  Integer 8 
13 PE TLS table  Integer 6 
Total 25,592 
 
Figure 2 shows main graphic user interface (GUI) of the PE-Miner that extracts raw features 
from PE files in a specified folder and automatically stores all features in a database. 
 
Figure 2. PE-Miner program’s main GUI 
3.3 Feature selection 
The data must be pre-processed to select a subset of the attributes to use in learning because 
many practical situations have far too many attributes in for learning schemes to handle, and 
some of them-perhaps the overwhelming majority-are clearly irrelevant or redundant. In 
practice learning methods performance can frequently be improved by preselecting, however 
learning methods themselves try to select attributes appropriately and ignore irrelevant or 
redundant ones, [14].  
After raw features of all executable programs in the database have been extracted using PE-
Miner program, the system computes each PE header feature’s Information Gain value by 
Equation (3) in Subsection 3.1, and calling frequency of DLLs and API functions.  The top-20 
PE header features ranked by IG on dataset are presented in Table 3.  
Table 3. List of the top ranked 20 features of the PE header 
№ Features 
Mean values 
Malware Benign 
1 SizeOfInitializedData  59,675,152 600,081 
2 NumberOfSymbols 59,251,515 1,655,386 
3 certificateTableSize 103,615,710 388,027 
4 exporttableSize 8,350,672 1,702 
5 IATSIZE 2,341,313 509 
6 BoundImportSize 68,707,156 200,506 
7 LoadConfigTableSize 86,574,977 306,799 
8 BaseRelocationTableSize 58,377,700 228,904 
9 e_cp 1,273 5 
10 CLRRuntimeHeaderSize 49,875,208 135,841 
11 VirtualSize   60,309,693 301,690 
12 SizeOfRawData 80,791,328 1,817,641 
13 NumberOfLineNumbers  1,675 3 
14 e_cblp 1,353 143 
15 e_minalloc 1,118 2 
16 NumberOfRelocations   1,167 67 
17 AddressOfFuncitons 2,884,543 378,963 
18 AddressOfNameOrdinals 2,538,096 382,150 
19 AddressOfNames 2,624,183 11,265 
20 e_ovno 1,409 10 
 
As shown in Table 3, there is a significant difference the values of major linker versions and the 
size of the initialized data in the benign and malicious executables. The size of the initialized 
data in benign executables is usually significantly higher compared to those of the malicious 
executables. It is interesting to note that a reasonable number of symbols are present in benign 
executables. It can be seen in Table 3 that the values of fields such as number of relocation and 
a number of line numbers are significantly higher in the malware executable in comparison. 
Note that the number of functions is relatively higher for the malware executables. 
Considering every DLL as a feature seems to be useful because a program’s DLLs can tell you a 
lot about its functionality. The top-30 DLL name features ranked by calling frequency on 
dataset are presented in Table 4. Most commonly used DLL is Kernel32.dll that contains core 
functionality, such as access and manipulation of memory, files, and hardware.  
Table 4. List of the top ranked 30 DLL names by calling frequency 
No DLLs Frequency Description 
1. kernel32.dll 3,467,435 Windows NT BASE API Client DLL 
2. user32.dll 912,115 USER API Client DLL 
3. advapi32.dll 441,914 Advanced Win32 application programming interfaces 
4. gdi32.dll 201,687 GDI Client DLL, involved in graphical displays. 
5. wininet.dll 84,100 Internet Extensions for Win32 
6. comctl32.dll 72,010 User Experience Controls Library 
7. shell32.dll 55,169 Windows Shell Common DLL 
8. wsock32.dll 49,133 Windows Socket 32-Bit DLL 
9. oleaut32.dll 49,060 OLE 2 - 32 automation 
10. msvbvm50.dll 44,851 Visual Basic Virtual Machine 
11. ole32.dll 43,531 32-bit OLE 2.0 component 
12. shlwapi.dll 38,718 Library for UNC and URL Paths, Registry Entries 
13. ws2_32.dll 22,486 Windows Socket 2.0 32-Bit DLL 
14. ntdll.dll 18,570 Win32 NTDLL core component 
15. urlmon.dll 16,117 OLE32 Extensions for Win32 
16. version.dll 12,481 Version Checking and File Installation Libraries 
17. crtdll.dll 11,420 Microsoft C Runtime Library 
18. comdlg32.dll 10,484 Common Dialogue Library 
19. winnm.dll 8,793 Windows Multimedia API 
20. rpcrt4.dll 5,531 Remote Procedure Call Runtime 
21. psapi.dll 5,228 The process status application programming interface 
22. msvcr100.dll 4,702  Microsoft Visual C++ Redistributable DLL 
23. hal.dll 3,993 The Windows Hardware Abstraction Layer 
24. mpr.dll 3,670 Multiple Provider Router DLL 
25. netapi32.dll 3,510 Net Win32 API DLL 
26. avicap32.dll 3,177  AV1 capture API 
27. rasapi32.dll 2,973 Remote Access 16-bit API Library 
28. cygwin1.dll 2,803 Cygwin® POSIX Emulation DLL 
29. mscoree.dll 2,774 Microsoft .NET Runtime Execution Engine 
30. imagehlp.dll 2,049 Windows NT Image Helper 
 
Using Windows’ advanced core components such as the Service Manager and Registry are 
provided by Advapi32.dll. User32.dll contains all the user-interface components, such as 
buttons, scroll bars, and components for controlling and responding to user actions. Gdi32.dll 
contains functions for displaying and manipulating graphics. Executables generally do not 
import Ntdll.dll directly, although it is always imported indirectly by Kernel32.dll. It is a file 
containing the interface to the Windows kernel. If an executable imports this file, it means that 
the author intended to use functionality not normally available to Windows programs. Some 
tasks, such as hiding functionality or manipulating processes, will use this interface. 
WSock32.dll and Ws2_32.dll are networking DLLs. Programs connect to a network or perform 
network-related tasks that access either of these files. Higher-level networking functions that 
implement protocols such as FTP, HTTP, and NTP are contained in Wininet.dll. The last 
domain of relevant features is API call categories (see in Figure 3).   
kernel32.dll.LoadLibraryA;kernel32.dll.GetProcAddress;….  
advapi32.dll.RegSetValueExA;advapi32.dll.RegOpenKeyExBookmark;… 
user32.dll.MessageBoxA; user32.dll.GetKeyboardType; … 
wsock32.dll.recv; wsock32.dll.send; …  
Figure 3. API functions called inside each DLL 
As a result of our experimental analysis on the malicious executables in the dataset, we have 
identified seven main groups of commonly used API function call features that are based on the 
malicious behaviours and these are listed below: 
File-related behaviour: Create a specific file in sensitive folders; Delete, break, cover system 
files or application files; Edit file; Traverse file directory and search for target files; 
Process-related behaviour: Release DLL file to inject into system process and create a new 
thread to hide itself; Create new processes to execute its code; Create threads to search and 
terminate the process of anti-virus or protection software; Create a matrix process to prevent 
repeated execution; 
Memory-related behaviour: Free, move and replace spaces of the memory; Occupy extra 
memory space, decrease the total available memory size; Forbid memory allocation and reclaim 
memory space; Point the interrupt vector address to the initial address of the malicious code; 
Register-related behaviour: Add or delete system service; Auto run while the system is 
starting up; Hide and protect itself; Undermine system function; 
Network-related behaviour: Open or listen specific port; Send through chatting software; 
Steal information and sending them to the mailbox; Enumerate weak password vulnerable 
computers; Occupying resources; 
Windows service behaviour: Terminating windows update service; Terminating windows 
firewall; Opening Telnet service;  
Other behaviours: Hooking keyboard; Hiding window; Alter system time to disable software 
prevention; Restart the computer; Scan existing vulnerabilities of the system; 
To interpret these features, when going back to malware definitions and their known major 
behaviours we can conclude that file management is the most important activity in viruses, 
because this kind of malware is known to copy itself multiple times and mutate itself 
every now and then if it's a polymorphic/metamorphic malware. Another difference 
when studying malware and benign applications is the type of process management 
done by malicious code that is intended to hide from, or spoof antivirus tools and 
process monitors. Since getting hidden is more complicated than running normally, this 
approach needs more calls to process management procedures. The third discriminative 
category is the Memory, which shows the difference that malicious executable intends 
to free, move and replace spaces of the memory. Next category is the Registry, malicious 
executables have heavily used the Windows Registry to change system menus, user privileges, 
startup programs, and file extension handling attributes to ease malware distribution or to 
destruct the target computer and so on next category behaviours are activated. 
According to PE header, DLL, and API function’s feature sets constructed above, we could use 
a feature vector to represent each program Pi. Each vector element corresponds to a feature Fj. 
And its value indicates whether that executable has the corresponding feature or not. With these 
values, the feature vector F for a program P is defined as follows: 
F = {F1, F2, F3, … Fn} 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Our dataset consists of a total of a total 247348 Windows programs in the PE file format that are 
236756 malicious and 10592 clean programs. There were no duplicate programs in our dataset. 
The malicious programs were obtained from several sources such as VX Heavens Virus 
Collection database, our local laboratory, and our colleague’s laboratory in Taiwan. The 
numbers of malicious programs are grouped by their corresponding family name in Table 1. The 
clean programs were collected from Download.com, freshly installed Windows’s system files 
and local laboratories. This is a comprehensive database that contains many thousands of 
malware samples. The samples consist of Virus, Worm, Trojan, Backdoors, and Spyware etc..  
We only consider non-packed Windows binary files in PE format. Some malware writers 
compress their code to make them undetectable by antivirus programs. So we first used a 
number of the most popular tools to decompress the files, which are compressed, such as UPX, 
ASPack, PECompact, etc. that make the PEs recognizable by the PE parser. We have selected to 
evaluate the performance of the following classifiers: SVM, J48, and NB rule learner. All of 
these classifiers are available as part of the Java-based open source machine learning toolkit 
Weka [14]. We have done our experiments on an Intel Pentium Core 2 Duo 2.33 GHz processor 
with 2GB RAM. The Microsoft Windows 7 SP1 is installed on this machine.  
We trained and tested the classifiers (SVM, J48, NB), with cross-validation 10 folds, i.e., the 
dataset is randomly divided into 10 smaller subsets, where 9 subsets are used for training and 1 
subset is used for testing. The process is repeated 10 times for every combination. This 
methodology helps in evaluating the robustness of a given approach to detect malicious Win32 
files that contain malware without any a priori information. 
4.1 Performance evaluation criteria 
We have used the standard 10-fold cross-validation process in our experiments: the dataset is 
randomly divided into 10 smaller subsets, where 9 subsets are used for training and 1 subset is 
used for testing. The process is repeated 10 times for every combination. To evaluate our system 
we were interested in several quantities listed below: 
True Positives (TP): the number of malicious executable examples classified as malicious 
executable 
True Negatives (TN): the number of benign programs classified as benign 
False Positives (FP): the number of benign programs classified as malicious executable 
False Negatives (FN): the number of malicious executable classified as benign executable 
We were interested in the detection rate of the classifiers. In our case this was the percentage of 
the total malicious programs labelled malicious. We were also interested in the false positive 
rate. This was the percentage of benign programs which were labelled as malicious, also called 
false alarms.  
True positive rate is also called the Detection Rate (DR) and defined as   
 
False Positive Rate (FPR) as 
   
and Overall Accuracy (OA)  
as   
Evaluating the detection efficiency of the system, it is not only considering the higher TP rate 
but also considering the lower FP rate. Therefore, the overall accuracy could be the main 
reference for us to compromise both TP rate and FP rate.   
 
4.2 Results 
There were total 138 PE header, 792 DLL, and 24662 API function’s raw features in 
our feature set. We did some experiment to select a subset of features by the detection 
rate of the system. We just selected a number of features with different ranges, trained 
the system, and tested it to see the overall accuracy. According to the result of our analysis, 
we finally selected the top 88 PE header, 130 DLL, and 2453 API function features to train our 
system which had better performances with the classifiers. A number of selected subset features 
of the experiments are given in Table 5. A list of the full classification results are shown in 
Table 7.  
Table 5. J48 classifier’s experimental results of the subset feature selection 
Feature name # (features) DR (%) FPR (%) OA (%) 
PE header 88 99.1 2.7 97.8 
DLLs 130 96.2 8.6 95.4 
API functions 2,453 97.8 5.3 96.5 
 
In order to know the contribution of PCA transformation, we first removed PCA function from 
the system, i.e., the selected features were directly applied to train the classifiers. When 
we enabled PCA function, we got better results as shown in Table 6. The training time 
was much lessened from a couple of days to several hours because of the number of 
features being transformed and reduced, and the performances were raised as well.  
TABLE 6. The effect of PCA upon the performance of J48 classifier 
Feature name 
# (feature) DR (%) 
Before 
PCA 
After 
PCA 
Before 
PCA 
After 
PCA 
PE header 88 39 99.1 99.5 
DLLs 130 75 96.2 97.5 
API functions 2,453 307 98.9 99.3 
 
Finally, we have three different kinds of features from the Windows executables in our dataset. 
We combined these features with each other into one feature set, which we call the hybrid 
feature set (HFS), that we are interested in knowing if we use a hybrid feature set, whether the 
detection rate of the system is improved or not. Table 7 shows the complete classification 
results of the system. 
Table 7. List of the system performance by individual and combined features 
Feature type Classifier DR (%) FPR (%) OA (%) 
PE header 
Naïve-Bayes 96  9.1 77  
SVM 97  7.6  80  
J48 99.5 2.7 99 
API functions 
Naïve-Bayes 88 7.7  97  
SVM 97 7.1 81 
J48 99.3 5.3 99.1 
DLLs 
Naïve-Bayes 65  8.0  89 
SVM 70 5.6 91 
J48 97.5 8.6 96.9 
Hybrid feature 
PE header&DLLs 
Naïve-Bayes 95  8.9  72  
SVM 96  7.3  85  
J48 97.1 4.7 90 
PE header&API functions 
Naïve-Bayes 94  8.2  93  
SVM 98  5.3 97  
J48 99.6 2.7  99  
ALL 
Naïve-Bayes 94  9. 2 93  
SVM 97  4. 5 97  
J48 97.6 2.8  98  
 
As shown in Table 7 the detection accuracy of J48 classifier outperforms the rest of the data 
mining classifiers in most of the cases. We can conclude from Table 7 that the classifiers using 
the DLL name feature had the lowest detection rate. Further, Naïve-Bayes gives the worst 
detection accuracy in most cases. The classifiers using combined PE header and API function 
features give slightly better detection accuracy than the classifiers using PE header feature 
alone. As the result we can conclude that the PE header feature without combining with the 
other features can be effectively used for detecting zero day malwares. Moreover, a classifier 
using PE header feature can have the smallest processing overheads. 
4.3 Implementation 
We implement an application program named malDetection which is integrated several 
approaches that we have mentioned in the previous sections. Therefore, first, we export 
a model of trained J48 classifier from the WEKA. And then we integrate the model and 
the other functions, which extract, select, and reduce features of PE file, into an 
application program. Figure 4 shows main GUI of the malDetection program. 
 
Figure 4. Main GUI of the malDetection program  
The malDetection program’s working steps are illustrated in Figure 5. 
Step 1: It browses specified directory and its subdirectories to find files in the directory; if a file 
in the directory is not PE format file, it just ignores the file and continues its work; 
Step 2: It parses PE tables of the executable to find out all PE header information, DLL names, 
and API functions inside each DLL as raw features; 
Step 3: It selects the specified features from the raw features; 
Step 4: Principal Component Analysis is applied to further transform and reduce the number of 
features;  
Step 5: It transforms a program’s data to its corresponding feature vector; and then apply to a 
classification algorithm; 
Step 6: It prints the classification results as shown at the bottom of Figure 4; 
 
Figure 5. Working steps of the malDetection program 
Finally, we prepared a standalone setup project from the malDetection program’ source file.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This work presented a static malware detection system using data mining techniques.  This 
system is based on mining PE header information, DLL name, API function calls inside each 
DLL features of the executables for detecting malware and malicious codes. We developed a 
PE-Miner program to parse PE format of the Windows executables in our dataset. The PE 
Miner extracts all PE header information, DLL names, and API function calls inside each DLL 
contained in a PE file. And this program stores all the extracted information in a database.   
After raw features of all executable programs in the database have been extracted using PE-
Miner program, the system computes each PE header feature’s Information Gain values and 
counts the calling frequencies of DLLs and API functions to select subset feature sets. 
According to the result of our analysis, we finally take top 88 PE header, 130 DLL, and 2453 
API function features to train our system which had better performances with the classifiers. 
In order to know the contribution of PCA transformation, we first removed PCA function from 
the system, i.e., the selected features were directly applied to train the classifiers. When we 
enabled PCA function, we got better results and the training time was much lessened from a 
couple of days to several hours because of the number of features being transformed and 
reduced, and the performances were raised as well. Finally, we combine the three different 
kinds of features into one feature set, which we call the hybrid feature set (HFS), and these 
features are used to train SVM, J48, and NB classifiers respectively for detection of Windows 
PE malwares.  
As shown the experimental results, the detection accuracy of J48 classifier outperforms the rest 
of the data mining classifiers in most of the cases. And, the classifiers using the DLL name 
feature had the lowest detection rate. Further, Naïve-Bayes gives the worst detection accuracy in 
most cases. The classifiers using combined PE header and API function features give slightly 
better detection accuracy than the classifiers using PE header feature alone. As the result we can 
conclude that the PE header feature without combining with the other features can be effectively 
used for detecting zero day malwares. Moreover, a classifier using PE header feature can have 
the smallest processing overheads. The experimental results show that our system’s the best 
detection accuracy is 99.6% with the false positive rate 2.7%.  
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